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Executive Summary
The purpose of this study was to examine a set of user acceptance criteria for autonomous 
biological detection systems for application in high-traffic, public facilities. The test case for the 
acceptance criteria was the Autonomous Pathogen Detection System (APDS) operating in high-
traffic facilities in New York City (NYC). 
The goals of this document are 
· To serve as informal guidance for users in considering the benefits and costs of these 
systems. 
· To serve as informal guidance for developers in understanding the needs of users. 
Acceptance criteria were assessed as a function of two major categories of parameters: 
performance criteria and readiness criteria. Performance criteria include technical items such as 
types of biothreat agents, numbers of agents, speed to reach an actionable result, and instrument 
sensitivity, as well as operational items such as cost and mean time between failures. Readiness 
criteria include factors such as system maturity, the supply chain, and funding. A particular 
biological detection system will not be usable until readiness criteria are met.
The performance measures can be viewed as contributing to cost or benefit for an autonomous 
biological detection system in the following manner: The benefit of the system is detection of 
biological threat agents of interest at levels and on timescales that enable effective public-health 
response to reduce deaths, illness, and exposure. The cost of the system is up-front acquisition 
and operating cost to the sponsor plus indirect cost to local authorities arising from impacts on 
operations. 
Linking performance parameters closely to cost and benefit categories results in an unusual 
ordering of the parameters, but all of the standard parameters should be represented here in some 
form. In some cases where the parameter could fit in more than one place, the best fit was 
chosen. The document needs to be taken as a whole. 
In follow-up work, this framework will be used to systematically document the APDS for 
appropriateness and readiness for use in NYC. 
The review panel had some overall recommendations that go beyond the acceptance criteria
themselves: 
· The overall prevention-detection-response-restoration system should be laid out so the 
individual elements (such as a biological detector) can be understood or specified in context. 
This systems layout could then be used for a systems cost/benefit analysis. 
· Threat scenarios should be specified and translated into quantitative technical requirements. 
· Current capabilities should be specified and translated into quantitative technical 
requirements. 
· The detailed technical requirements noted above from the threat scenarios and the current 
capabilities should be compared. 
· These criteria and this sort of effort need to be coordinated with BioWatch guidance 
documents and with Public Health Actionable Assays effort. 
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1. Introduction
1.1. Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to examine a set of user acceptance criteria for autonomous 
biological detection systems for application in high-traffic, public facilities. The test case for the 
acceptance criteria was the Autonomous Pathogen Detection System (APDS) operating in high-
traffic facilities in New York City (NYC). However, the acceptance criteria were designed to be 
generally applicable to other biological detection systems in other locations. For such detection 
systems, “users” will include local authorities (e.g., facility operators, public health officials, and 
law enforcement personnel) and national authorities [including personnel from the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS), the BioWatch Program, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)]. The panel members brought 
expertise from a broad range of backgrounds to complete this picture. 
The goals of this document are
1. To serve as informal guidance for users in considering the benefits and costs of these 
systems. 
2. To serve as informal guidance for developers in understanding the needs of users. 
In follow-up work, this framework will be used to systematically document the APDS for 
appropriateness and readiness for use in NYC. 
1.2. Review Panel Recommendations 
The review panel had some overall recommendations that go beyond the acceptance criteria:
· The overall prevention-detection-response-restoration system should be laid out so the 
individual elements (such as a biological detector) can be understood or specified in context. 
This systems layout could then be used for a systems cost/benefit analysis. 
· Threat scenarios should be specified and translated into quantitative technical requirements. 
· Current capabilities should be specified and translated into quantitative technical 
requirements. 
· The detailed technical requirements noted above from the threat scenarios and the current 
capabilities should be compared. 
· These criteria and this sort of effort need to be coordinated with BioWatch guidance 
documents and with Public Health Actionable Assays effort. 
1.3. Concept of Operations
These acceptance criteria for autonomous biological detection systems are defined in the context 
of the following concept of operations (ConOps): 
Autonomous biological detectors are assumed to be unmanned, field-deployed 
instruments that monitor air in high-traffic, public facilities. The detectors supply 
biological information to public health officials by text-message alerts and by 
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detailed data feeds, when necessary. Public health officials decide when the 
instrument signals truly indicate the presence of a biological threat agent and then 
alert other stakeholders, including facility operators, national public health 
officials, and law enforcement officials. Stakeholders respond on the basis of pre-
established protocols. Possible responses include closing a facility before manual 
sampling and follow-up testing are done. 
The above ConOps is consistent with that developed and in place for the BioWatch Program and 
follows from discussions carried out among a broad set of New York City agencies on the use of 
autonomous biological detectors. 
1.4. Organization of User Acceptance Criteria 
Acceptance criteria were assessed as a function of two major categories of parameters: 
performance criteria and readiness criteria. Performance criteria include technical items such as 
types of biothreat agents, numbers of agents, speed to reach an actionable result, and instrument 
sensitivity, as well as operational items such as cost and mean time between failures. Readiness 
criteria include factors such as system maturity, the supply chain, and funding. A particular 
biological detection system will not be usable until readiness criteria are met.
In theory, the ideal solution for developing acceptance criteria would be to vary all of the 
performance measures to minimize an all-inclusive cost-benefit function. However, in practical 
terms, identifying performance measures and acceptable values of each for a mission is a good 
starting point. The measures can still be viewed as contributing to cost or benefit for an 
autonomous biological detection system in the following manner: The benefit of the system is 
detection of biological threat agents of interest at levels and on timescales that enable effective 
public-health response to reduce deaths, illness, and exposure. The cost of the system is up-front 
acquisition and operating cost to the sponsor plus indirect cost to local authorities arising from 
impacts on operations. 
The next major section of this report details a set of performance criteria. For each parameter, 
there is a “Description” section followed by a “Specification and Justification” section. At this 
stage the specifications are not complete, but the eventual goal is to set quantitative thresholds 
(minimum requirements) and goals (desired values). The following major section details a set of 
readiness criteria as a checklist of items that should be accomplished before startup. In outline 
form, the discussion is organized as follows: 
· Performance
– Detect agents of interest 
– Detect in the required environments 
– Detect at effective levels 
– Enable public-health response
– Report on an effective timescale 
– Direct acquisition cost is acceptable to the sponsor 
– Direct operating cost is acceptable to the sponsor
– Indirect operating cost is acceptable to the local authorities
· Readiness 
– Approved by local agencies 
– Approved by local/state/federal regulatory agencies 
341872-1020100.doc page 10 of 30
– Approved by Public Health Actionable Assays process 
– SAFETY Act addressed 
– Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) completed and approved
– Acceptance testing completed and approved 
– Supply chain established
– Cost model validated
– Funding secured
– ConOps approved
– Standard Operating Procedures established
– Response protocols established
– QA/QC protocols established 
– Training packages developed 
– Infrastructures prepared 
The high-level criteria here are either cost or benefit, but there are additional low-level factors 
that will be practical constraints contributing to the criteria. 
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2. Performance Criteria
As explained in the previous section, the performance measures are organized by benefit (Detect 
agents of interest, Detect in the required environments, Detect at effective levels, Enable public-
health response, and Report on an effective timescale) and cost (Direct acquisition cost is 
acceptable to the sponsor, Direct operating cost is acceptable to the sponsor, and Indirect 
operating cost is acceptable to the local authorities). Each measure has a section for description 
and a section for specification. 
2.1. Detect Agents of Interest 
This section requires that the system detect the agents of interest, in terms of both its capability 
while functioning and that it remains functional in the field. 
2.1.1. Agent Types
Description
Agent types are bacteria, viruses, and toxins (proteins). Some bacteria of concern form spores in 
addition to vegetative cells, and both forms are assumed to be included.
Specification and Justification
The instrument should be capable of detecting all three agent types for general applicability. 
2.1.2. Agent Panel 
Description
The agent panel is the set of agents targeted for detection in a deployment. 
Specification and Justification
The agent panel will be taken from a DHS/DHHS threat list and must be integrated with the 
operating BioWatch and LRN system. This is particularly sensitive information and must be 
carefully controlled. 
2.1.3. Number of Signatures
Description
The instrument must be able to correctly and reliably identify multiple agent signatures in a 
single sample. This can be accomplished by multiplexing (simultaneously identifying multiple 
signatures) or by serial analysis (running sequential tests for signatures on a sample). Either way, 
the results for multiple signatures must be available in the specified time (see Section 2.5.2 Time
to Results). The required number of signatures will depend on the number of agents (see Section 
2.1.2 Agent Panel) and the signatures per agent needed to get the required breadth and 
confirmation. Another measure, the desired number of signatures, will include room for 
additional signatures for better speciation and for emerging threats. 
Specification and Justification
To be completed later. 
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2.1.4. Time to Add an Assay
Description
The time to add an assay to the system is measured from when an agent is isolated to when an 
assay can be operational on the system. This parameter is a quantitative measure of the 
upgradeability of the instrument. Upgradeability provides better protection because additional 
speciation or emerging threats can be covered. It also delays system obsolescence. 
Specification and Justification
To be completed later. 
2.1.5. Probability of Detection 
Description
The definition of probability of detection, pd, is the probability that an input exactly at the limit 
of detection (LOD) will be detected by the system. In this definition, the LOD is not a fixed 
value but depends on the desired pd. Thus, pd is inseparable from LOD and also quantitatively 
related to the probability of false positive and often the detection speed (see Section 5.1 ROC
curves). At a given operating condition, increasing input concentrations would normally result in 
increasing the probabilities of detection. Probability of detection has a value between 0 and 1 and 
needs to be specified for each agent. The pd also has an associated confidence level depending on 
the number of experiments performed. 
Specification and Justification
To be completed later. 
2.1.6. Operational Availability
Description
Operational availability, AO, represents the fraction of time that a system performs as desired. For 
a continuously running system, this is approximately the uptime divided by the total time in the 
field. Although it is often viewed as a maintenance parameter, AO is closely related to pd, in that 
if the system is not operating, an input will not be detected. Maintenance and cost implications
are addressed in Section 2.7.1 Direct Operating Cost. Operational availability has a value 
between 0 and 1. 
Specification and Justification
To be completed later. 
2.2. Detect in the Required Environments 
The system must perform to its technical requirements in the environments of interest. It is not 
possible to predict all of the factors that might be relevant in these environments, but some of the 
main criteria are given below and some of the additional possible factors are listed. 
2.2.1. Environments of Interest
Description 
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The environments of interest for the ConOps may serve as general guidance for the developer 
and will be locations for field testing. 
Specification and Justification
The current ConOps requires that the system function in indoor environments that are not fully 
environmentally controlled like subway platforms, commuter rail platforms, passenger 
concourses, and HVAC equipment rooms. The air of these environments is breathed by 10,000 
to 750,000 people per day. 
2.2.2. Temperature Range 
Description
The temperature range brackets the ambient temperatures that could be experienced during a 
given mission. Both external effects on equipment and internal effects on an air sample must be 
considered. 
Specification and Justification 
The environments of interest are not fully environmentally controlled, so the temperatures are 
beyond normal room temperatures. MTA/Transit has a standard of -10 to 43 ºC for their 
platforms. MTA/MNR suggested 0 to 40 ºC. 
2.2.3. Humidity Range 
Description 
The humidity range brackets the ambient humidity that could be experienced during a given 
mission. Humidity can include water vapor in terms of relative humidity (between 0 and 100 %) 
and condensed water as mist and rain. Both external effects on equipment and internal effects on 
the air sample need to be considered. 
Specification and Justification 
The environments of interest are not fully environmentally controlled, so the humidity is beyond 
normal room range, but there will not be direct rain. MTA/Transit has a standard of 10 to 95 % 
relative humidity for equipment on their platforms. 
2.2.4. Particle Tolerance 
Description 
Particle tolerance specifies the upper limit of particles in the air that the system must be able to 
handle. The air concentration, expressed as particles/liter of air, should be considered for a given 
size range of dust particles. The composition of particles may also be important. Both external 
effects on equipment and internal effects on the air sample need to be considered. 
Specification and Justification 
Since the target particles are 1 to 10 microns, this will be the range of interest when 
concentrations are specified, later. 
2.2.5. Battery Capability  
Description 
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The system must have battery-backup to allow some operation if facility power is lost from 
either inadvertent or nefarious activities. 
Specification and Justification 
The system needs to be able to complete one full analysis panel and transmit the results on 
battery power. 
2.2.6. Additional Factors 
Description 
Additional environmental factors are listed here for consideration, but not specified. 
· Vibration, particularly in transport. 
· Electromagnetic Compatability (EMC), Electromagnetic Interference (EMI), and 
Electromagnetic Discharge (ESD). 
· Liquid and chemical splashes and spills. 
· Human interference. 
2.3. Detect at Effective Levels 
This section requires that the sensitivity be high enough (limit of detection low enough) that the 
system covers enough space, release scenarios, or people to be of significant benefit. 
2.3.1. Sensitivity as Limit-of-Detection 
Description 
Sensitivity as limit-of-detection (LOD) is the input signal level that will be detected at a 
specified probability of detection pd (see also Sections 2.1.5 Probability of Detection and
5.1 ROC curves). The pd also has an associated confidence level depending on the number of 
experiments performed. The related parameter of selectivity is also discussed in Section 2.4.3. 
Several points need to be considered: 
1. A measure of concentration in air should be the basis for sensitivity. Sensitivity in terms of 
absolute number of particles is not appropriate except to compare techniques using the same 
collector and sample size. The concentration can be related to a level of threat by considering 
infectious doses combined with the movements of agents and people in a facility. 
2. Strictly speaking, the full time-course of the concentration in air at the analysis point should 
be specified. It often is not, so there is some arbitrariness. Instantaneous sensors depend 
mostly on concentration (e.g., ac , in targets/L air), whereas integrating collectors depend on 
concentration available for collection over time (e.g., tca , in targets·minutes/L air). We use 
the time-integrated definition, limiting the release considered to a collection window (see 
Section 2.5.1 Sampling Period). 
3. The units for targets in the biological materials vary. Possible units for bacteria include 
particle, colony-forming-unit (cfu), spore, DNA copy, and agent-containing particle. Full 
specification of the aerosol composition (live bacteria, dead bacteria, extraneous DNA, 
extraneous protein, particle agglomeration, particle-size distribution) is usually not given. 
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Similar problems apply to virus and protein units. Because the bacterial source materials are 
quantified in cfu/mL, we use that unit for liquid and cfu·minutes/L air for air. Similarly, we 
will use pfu·minutes/L air for viruses and ng·minutes/L air for toxins. For genomic analysis it 
may be less ambiguous to use copy·minutes/L air for both bacteria and viruses. 
4. The sensitivity (LOD) for most systems is variable and depends on one or more threshold 
settings, which also affects probability of false positive, pf. Sensitivity also depends on the 
probability of detection, pd, that is desired. Thus, pf can be set independently, but LOD 
requires pd and pf to be specified. 
5. Aerosol releases to directly determine sensitivity cannot be done in the field. Conversely, 
aerosol chambers do not have representative environmental influences to yield accurate pf, 
and aerosol release testing is time consuming for determining LOD. It is common to combine 
field data to determine noise levels and pf, laboratory spike data to determine pd response to 
known liquid concentrations, and aerosol collector testing to relate the liquid and air 
concentrations. 
6. A common medical definition of sensitivity is the number of true positives divided by the 
number of actual cases (true positives plus false negatives). The result of such a calculation is 
a type of probability of detection measured for a set of potentially unquantified inputs, not a 
sensitivity in terms of biothreat agent levels. Such an approach is appropriate for a side-by-
side probability comparison of two methods on a fixed set. It is not appropriate for technical 
specification because results will vary depending on the challenges presented to the system. 
Specification and Justification 
To be completed later. 
2.4. Enable Public Health Response 
This section concerns the quality of the information made available to the decision-makers.
Some of the parameters that could arguably be in this section (probability of detection, limit of 
detection, time to results) are addressed in other benefit sections. 
2.4.1. Probability of Autonomous False Positives 
Description 
A false positive is defined as a positive signal that requires a response when there was actually 
no agent present. Both “rate” and “probability” can be used for false positive. “False positive 
rate” should have units of (false events)/time. “Probability of false positive” should have units of 
(false events)/(total events). Probabilities are useful because they are independent of numbers of 
instruments and sampling rate; however, in most cases a user wants to know how often a false 
alarm will occur (rate of false positives). The related parameter of false negatives is discussed as 
probability of detection in Section 2.1.5 and also in 5.1 ROC curves. 
This section specifies the autonomous false positive directly from the instrument, with the 
ConOps model in mind that biological signals from the instrument will need to be reviewed by a 
human monitor who makes a decision (“man-in-the-loop”, see Figure 1 in Section 5.2 Program
Execution). This, then, becomes the probability that the human monitor will need to review the 
data when there is actually no agent present. 
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Specification and Justification 
To be completed later. 
2.4.2. Probability of Actionable False Positives 
Description 
The general description of false positive given above applies here as well, but this section 
specifies the probability that a false positive makes it through human review. This becomes the 
probability that the Biological Action Committee will need act when there is actually no agent 
present (see Figure 1 in Section 5.2 Program Execution). 
Specification and Justification 
To be completed later. 
2.4.3. Selectivity
Description 
The general definition of selectivity is a measure of how well a system can distinguish a target in 
the presence of near-neighbors. Selectivity can be defined quantitatively in terms of the 
concentrations of target and of near-neighbor that give the same signal level, resulting in values 
from 0 to 1 for each target/near-neighbor pair. The near-neighbor must be defined, then the 
selectivity can be specified or measured based on specified or actual interfering concentration. 
Selectivity should be distinguished from specificity, which, strictly defined, is perfect selectivity. 
Further, a common medical definition of specificity is the number of true negatives divided by 
the number of actual negatives (true negatives plus false positives). The result of such a 
calculation is actually a type of probability of not false positive, or 1 - (probability of false 
positive), not a selectivity in terms of distinguishing a target from a known near-neighbor. 
Specification and Justification 
The specification of selectivity will be part of the Public Health Actionable Assays process. 
2.4.4. Data Accessibility 
Description 
Data accessibility states that the data from the instruments are available by remote connection 
and interpretable by the local public-health employees. They will monitor the data and determine 
when the biological signals are actionable (see Figure 1 in Section 5.2 Program Execution). The 
levels of data accessibility can be defined as “raw data,” “summary data,” or “alarm status,” 
meaning that those are the finest data resolutions available. 
Specification and Justification 
A high data accessibility level of “raw data” will be required due to the newness of these systems 
and the high impact of the monitor’s decision. 
2.4.5. Remote System Diagnostics
Description 
Remote system diagnostics refers to both assay controls and instrument health signals that assure 
the instrument is functioning properly. One example is positive internal controls for the assays to 
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indicate that agent negatives are not false negatives. Another example is air flow rate 
measurement to indicate that sampling flow paths are not blocked. The levels of system 
diagnostics can be defined as “automated” (meaning the signals are automatically analyzed and 
warnings are automatically sent to the monitor), “manual” (meaning the signals are available for 
remote viewing but are not automatically analyzed), or “unavailable” (meaning that there is not 
remote access to complete system diagnostics). 
Specification and Justification 
A system diagnostics level of “automated” will be required to minimize the frequency and time 
of monitoring the instruments. 
2.4.6. Data Security
Description 
Data security refers to assurance that the data is not monitored or corrupted and that the system 
operations cannot be influenced through unauthorized access. 
Specification and Justification 
Signals that travel through any public medium (e.g., wireless or internet) must have at least 128-
bit encryption. The nodes must be fire-walled to prevent unauthorized access.
2.4.7. Physical Security
Description 
Physical security is assurance that the system cannot be readily disabled by unauthorized 
personnel. 
Specification and Justification 
To be completed later. 
2.4.8. Biohazard Security
Description 
Biohazard security is assurance that if the system collects hazardous material, it is contained in a 
manner that does not pose a threat to first responders. 
Specification and Justification 
To be completed later. 
2.4.9. Data Time-Stamping Capability 
Description 
Time-stamping is the identification of the electronic data with common clock time. This time-
stamping must be done to enable situational awareness and event reconstruction. 
Specification and Justification 
The instruments will time-stamp both biological and instrument-health signals and also 
synchronize their time within one minute of the U.S. Naval Observatory Master Clock in 
Washington, DC. 
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2.4.10. Data Archiving Duration 
Description 
Some amount of electronic data must be archived on the instrument and archived on networked 
servers or remote back-ups. The instrument data archiving is required in case of communication 
losses or for verification purposes. Off-instrument archiving is not addressed here because it is 
determined by the user’s operations and does not affect the instrument. 
Specification and Justification 
The archiving duration on the instrument needs to be at least one month. 
2.4.11. Sample Archiving Capability 
Description 
Archived samples from the system can be used for further lab-based testing of true positives or 
can be used to determine the cause of false positives. The sample integrity and identity must be 
maintained for forensics and investigations. 
Specification and Justification 
Samples identified as potentially positive must be individually archived to avoid dilution and
loss of sample temporal identity. Other samples may be pooled but not contaminated by the 
instrument, for example not combined with assay waste. 
2.5. Report on an Effective Timescale 
One major goal of autonomous biological detection is reporting information on a shorter 
timescale than manual systems. This includes the sampling period and the time to results.
2.5.1. Sampling Period
Description 
The sampling period is the time from start to end of collection and is the inverse of the sampling 
rate. Practically, sampling period is also the time resolution, meaning the time period to which an 
event may be ascribed. Time resolution allows for some identification of when a release 
occurred, how long a hazardous condition persisted, and who may have been exposed. Due to 
cost, manual sampling approaches usually operate on 24 hours at low-to-moderate threat 
conditions. Autonomous systems are expected to greatly reduce this time. 
Specification and Justification 
The systems should allow a sampling period between 1 and 24 hours. Changes to the sampling 
period should be possible through automated, semi-automated (remote), and manual control. 
2.5.2. Time to Results
Description 
Time to results is defined as the time from end of collection to when decision-makers have 
actionable information. Manual sampling approaches with daily pickup typically take about 8 
hours for transportation and analysis. Autonomous systems are expected to greatly reduce this 
time. The systems will be electronically networked to allow transmission of data nearly 
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instantaneously, but additional time for manual review and communication of results by public 
health authorities needs to be considered. 
Specification and Justification 
To be completed later. 
2.6. Direct Acquisition Cost is Acceptable to the Sponsor 
Here, costs are divided into direct and indirect costs, and the direct costs are divided into 
acquisition and operating costs paid by the sponsor. The sponsor could be a local or federal 
organization. 
2.6.1. Direct Acquisition Cost 
Description 
Direct acquisition cost is paid once by the sponsor to set up the capability. Since the largest 
component of this cost is likely to be the cost of the autonomous biological detectors themselves, 
there is reason to express the cost in dollars/instrument, even if this includes other costs and the 
cost varies with the number of instruments. The other costs should be itemized and include spare 
parts, site preparation, installation, training, and documentation. 
Specification and Justification 
Acceptable costs are between 25 and 250 k$/instrument, with the number of units deployed 
depending on this direct acquisition cost point, as well as operating cost and lifespan. 
2.7. Direct Operating Cost is Acceptable to the Sponsor
The second direct cost is a recurring operating cost paid by the sponsor.
2.7.1. Direct Operating Cost 
Description 
Direct operating cost requires recurring payment for running and maintaining the system. The 
contributions can include reagents and other consumables, replacement parts, labor of several 
types, and QA/QC of the operating instruments. The bottom-line effect of reliability and 
maintainability parameters like Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) and Mean Time To 
Repair (MTTR) are in direct operating cost here. MTBF and MTTR may also be specified 
independently as additional constraints if desired. Similarly, the skill level of maintainers directly 
affects the cost but may also be specified independently. 
Specification and Justification 
To be completed later. 
2.8. Indirect Operating Cost is Acceptable to Local Authorities
Indirect operating costs are used to represent the impact on the local stakeholders of having the 
system in their facilities, even if a separate sponsor is paying the direct financial costs. These 
costs are usually difficult to quantify, but the contributions can be identified and reasonable 
ranges can be established. 
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There is an indirect cost of high-consequence actions from false positives, but that parameter is 
specified in Section 2.4.2 Probability of Actionable False Positives. 
2.8.1. Local Interoperability 
Description 
Local interoperability refers to the need for the system to fit into the operations of the local 
authorities in the facility, public-health, and law-enforcement domains. 
Specification and Justification 
To be completed later. 
2.8.2. Facility Labor Requirement
Description 
Facility labor requirement specifies the amount of time and the skill level required of facility 
personnel for the operation. 
Specification and Justification 
To be completed later. 
2.8.3. Biological Monitor Labor Requirement
Description 
Biological monitor labor requirement specifies the amount of time and the skill level required of 
local biological personnel for the operation. 
Specification and Justification 
To be completed later. 
2.8.4. Maintenance Interval 
Description 
Maintenance interval refers to the time between regularly scheduled visits to the instruments in 
the field. The labor cost that these visits incur is taken into account in Section 2.7.1 Direct
Operating Cost; this section is meant to document that there may be impacts to the facilities 
associated with these visits. Manual sampling systems usually operate with daily visits at low-to-
moderate threat conditions, but autonomous systems are expected to require fewer visits. 
Specification and Justification 
One week is an acceptable maintenance interval in the ConOps selected here. 
2.8.5. Mean Time Between Failures
Description 
The mean time between failures (MTBF) is the time between unscheduled repair visits to the 
instrument. As was the case for the maintenance-interval metric above, the labor cost that these 
visits incur is taken into account in Section 2.7.1 Direct Operating Cost; this section is meant to 
document impacts to the facilities. 
Specification and Justification 
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If the failures require attention of facility personnel, the MTBF should be greater than 2 weeks. 
2.8.6. Power 
Description 
Electricity costs are likely to be minor, but power needs can impact local facilities significantly if 
they require new circuits, nonstandard voltages, or backup systems. 
Specification and Justification 
The instruments should use less than 15 A at 220 V, with a goal of less than 10 A at 110 V. The 
need for the instrument to survive moderate facility power losses is required in Section 




System size may have an indirect cost if it impacts operations, requires facility modification, or 
limits the useful locations for a detector. 
Specification and Justification 
To be completed later. 
2.8.8. Visual Impact 
Description 
Visual impact refers to the shape, configuration, and color of the instrument. In public locations, 
it is desired to have a visual impact level of “low”, meaning that the instrument should not 
significantly affect employees or customers or violate the historical or landmark consistency 
requirements. 
Specification and Justification 
To be completed later. 
2.8.9. Noise 
Description 
Noise has an indirect cost to the facility if affects employees or customers. 
Specification and Justification 
The instrument should contribute less than 85 dB in the environment. 
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3. Readiness Criteria 
The readiness criteria are milestones showing the capability to use the system in its intended role.
3.1. Approved by Local Agencies 
The process for high-level approval of the system by operating agencies (facilities, law 
enforcement, public health, et cetera) needs to be established and executed. 
3.2. Approved by Local/State/Federal Regulatory Agencies 
The extent of and process for approval of the system by local, state, and federal regulatory 
agencies need to be established and executed. 
3.3. Approved by Public Health Actionable Assays (PHAA) Process
The system should be approved by the Public Health Actionable Assays (PHAA) process 
established by DHS and DHHS. 
3.4. SAFETY Act Addressed 
The DHS SAFETY Act and its potential use in the operation need to be considered, and the 
actions taken need to be documented. 
3.5. OT&E Completed and Approved 
An operational test and evaluation (OT&E) in the relevant environments should be completed 
and approved by the local and national stakeholders. 
3.6. Acceptance Testing Completed and Approved 
Acceptance testing for the particular systems should be completed and approved by the local and 
national stakeholders. 
3.7. Supply Chain Established for Instruments, Parts, Reagents, and Service 
A supply chain should be established for instruments, parts, reagents, service, and any other 
resource that is a continuing requirement. This should include one year’s worth of required 
resources and identified suppliers for all items. 
3.8. Cost Model Validated 
A cost model for the operation should be developed, validated with measurements during 
operational testing, and then approved by the sponsor. 
3.9. Funding Secured 
Funding should be secured for the initial acquisition and the first year of operation, along with an 
execution plan for three years of continuation. 
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3.10. Concept of Operations Approved 
A Concept of Operations (ConOps) specific to the system and its intended use should be written 
and approved by local and national stakeholders. The ConOps will guide the creation of detailed 
procedures and response protocols. 
3.11. Standard Operating Procedures Established 
Standard operating procedures (SOPs) should be established and documented for all aspects of 
regular operation of the system, including preventative maintenance, repairs, system monitoring, 
signal interpretation, facility interactions, and lab support. 
3.12. Response Protocols Established 
Protocols for response to actionable signals should be established for all participating agencies. 
This should include emergency operating procedures and investigative protocols. 
3.13. QA/QC Protocols Established 
Protocols for continuing quality assurance and quality control should be documented and a 
verification plan established. This will include semi-annual or annual competency assessments 
and continuing education. 
3.14. Training Packages Developed 
Training packages should be developed for those who interact directly or indirectly with the new 
system. These will be specific to the required roles and will incorporate the SOPs and the 
Response Protocols noted above. 
3.15. Infrastructures Prepared on Levels of Facility, Region, and Nation 
The physical infrastructure, communications infrastructure, operational and interoperability 
infrastructures need to be prepared on the levels of the facility, region, and nation. 
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4. Summary Tables 
Table 1 identifies proposed performance criteria and units for each parameter, together with 
spaces for quantitative thresholds (minimum requirements) and proposed goals (desired values) 
for each criterion. Table 2 identifies the readiness criteria as a milestone checklist. The two 
tables are presented as starting points for discussion. 
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Table 1. Performance criteria.
Parameter Units Threshold Goal
Agent types Bacteria, viruses, and/or toxins
Agent panel list of agents 
Number of signatures Number of signatures >
Time to Add an Assay Days <
Probability of detection, 
agent #1 
Detection events/releases at LOD >
Probability of detection, 
agent #2, etc.
Detection events/releases at LOD >
Operational availability, Ao Hours uptime/hours deployed >
Environments of Interest (No units) 
Temperature range ºC
Humidity range % relative humidity
Particle tolerance particles of 1 to 10 um/L air >
Battery capability (No units) 
Additional factors (No units)
Sensitivity, bacterium #1 cfu·minute/L air <
Sensitivity, bacterium #2, 
etc. 
cfu·minute/L air <
Sensitivity, virus #1 pfu·minute/L air <
Sensitivity, virus #2, etc. pfu·minute/L air <
Sensitivity, toxin #1 ng·minute/L air <
Sensitivity, toxin #2, etc. ng·minute/L air <
Probability of autonomous 
false positive, agent #1
False events/sample <
Probability of autonomous 
false positive, agent #2, 
etc. 
False events/sample <
Probability of actionable 
false positive 
False events/sample <
Selectivity (Set by PHAA process) 




automated, manual, or 
unavailable 
Data security encryption type
Physical security high, medium, low 




Data archiving duration Days >
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Parameter Units Threshold Goal
Sample archiving 
capability 
Degree of isolation 
Sampling period Hours from collection start to end 
Time to results Hours from collection end to 
actionable result 
<
Direct acquisition cost $/instrument <
Direct operating cost $/instrument/year <
Local interoperability high, medium, low 
Facility labor requirement hrs/instrument/week and skill level 
Biological monitor labor 
requirement 
hrs/instrument/week and skill level 
Maintenance interval Days between service visits >
Mean time between 
failures, MTBF
Days between repairs >
Power requirements Amps and Volts <
Size Cubic meters <
Visual impact high, medium, low 
Noise dB <
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Table 2. Readiness criteria.
Milestone Completed
Approved by local operation agencies ¨
Approved by regulatory agencies ¨
Approved by Public Health Actionable Assays process ¨
SAFETY Act addressed ¨
OT&E completed and approved ¨
Acceptance testing completed and approved ¨
Supply chain established ¨
Cost model validated ¨
Funding secured ¨
Concept of Operations approved ¨
Standard Operating Procedures established ¨
Response protocols established ¨
QA/QC protocols established ¨
Training packages developed ¨
Infrastructures prepared on levels of facility, region, and nation ¨
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5. Special Topics
5.1. ROC curves
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves represent the relationship between probability 
of false positive, probability of detection, and limit of detection (pf, pd, and LOD) for a particular 
test. There are several potential misunderstandings that can be cleared up by considering the full 
implications of the ROC curves. 
1. The particular test must be set. This involves not only the signature itself but also the 
instrument, the time taken to run the test, the detection algorithm used, and the environment 
of the samples and instrument. 
2. Most tests can be represented by a 3-dimensional surface in probability of false positive, 
probability of detection, and limit of detection (pf, pd, and LOD). These three parameters 
cannot all be specified independently, and they must be specified in context of each other. 
3. The probability of false positive pf usually depends on one or more threshold settings and is 
adjustable. It can usually be set based solely on baseline data (“blanks” or noise) without 
knowledge of pd or LOD. 
4. The LOD and the pd are interrelated and depend on pf. At a fixed pd, the LOD increases 
(sensitivity decreases) if the threshold is adjusted to decrease pf. At a fixed pf, the LOD 
increases (sensitivity decreases) if larger pd is specified. 
In medical tests with a given data set, ROC curves are often presented as linear pf versus pd plots 
with axes from zero to unity. This representation does not work well for analyzing high-quality 
tests requiring very low pf, as is required for autonomous biological detection, because the only 
area of interest is very close to pf = 0. A better display of ROC curve is log(pf) versus LOD for a 
given pd. 
Practically, one might specify pf as a hard constraint based on operational considerations and 
then see what LOD results at reasonable pd (e.g., 90 %). One could also run an instrument 
without a threshold setting and continuously feed out pf for each test result instead. This is not 
commonly done. However, one should keep in mind that if a pf is set at 1.0 × 10-6, there is not 
much difference between a result at 1.1 × 10-6 that would be considered a negative and a result at 
0.9 × 10-6 that would be considered an alarm. 
5.2. Program Execution 
A process flow diagram for a proposed program execution for autonomous biological monitoring 
is shown in Figure 1. This diagram is included to address some of the operational questions that 
frequently arise. 
One important aspect of this process flow is that the biological signals from the instrument do 
not directly cause a response. Instead, the biological signals are manually interpreted by a 
biological monitor who decides if the signals are actionable. That information flow is the same as 
the current manual BioWatch system, where a biologist reviews the laboratory assay results to 
determine if they are valid or invalid. 
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Another aspect worth pointing out is that the instrument maintainer, including the field service 
personnel, does not need access to the reagent details or biological signals. They work based on 
operational health signals from the instruments. 
It is possible that the Integrator, Instrument Manufacturer, and Instrument Maintainer are the 
same organization, as is the case for the USPS’s Biohazard Detection System, but those 




































Figure 1. Flow diagram of proposed program execution for autonomous 
biological monitoring.
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6. Glossary
Actionable Information, Public Health Actionable Information: information of sufficient quality to 
motivate actions in the field, in particular actions to affect public health such as closing a facility, 
making public-health announcements, and performing follow-up sampling. 
Concept of Operations (ConOps): an overview of how a system is to be used, including organizations and 
their roles, processes that will be executed, and equipment to be used. 
Mean Time Between Failures: the average time of operation before a significant drop in performance 
occurs; approximately the deployed time divided by the number of failures. 
Multiplexing: simultaneously identifying multiple agent signatures. 
Selectivity: a measure of how well a system can distinguish a target in the presence of near-neighbors. 
Selectivity can be defined quantitatively in terms of the concentrations of target and of near-neighbor 
that give the same signal level, resulting in values from 0 to 1 for each target/near-neighbor pair. 
Differs from the medical definition of selectivity, which is an estimated 1 - (probability of false 
positive) for a particular set of samples.
Sensitivity: in terms of limit of detection (LOD), the concentration of agent that will result in a stated 
probability of false positive pf and probability of detection pd. Differs from the medical definition of 
sensitivity, which is an estimated probability of detection for a particular set of samples. 
Signature: an identifying characteristic of a biological threat agent, such as a specific nucleic acid 
sequence or protein epitope (binding site). 
